Nov 10 Excerpt: Audit vs. Scanner Counts

A. Ballot Count Accuracy

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies in data where no thorough or reasonable explanation is provided by election officials. The table below shows all districts with ballot count discrepancies.  In twelve (12) of these districts the scanner counted more ballots than reported as counted by hand; in six (6) of these districts, the scanner counted fewer ballots than were counted by hand.

Nov 2010

Scanner Counted Ballots Hand Counted Ballots Difference Percent Difference
2409 17 2392 -99.3%
796 943 147 18.5%
772 761 -11 -1.4%
1206 1216 10 0.8%
1292 1284 -8 -0.6%
364 362 -2 -0.5%
1982 1972 -10 -0.5%
1432 1438 6 0.4%
1956 1948 -8 -0.4%
386 385 -1 -0.3%
1213 1216 3 0.2%
2036 2041 5 0.2%
1269 1266 -3 -0.2%
1718 1714 -4 -0.2%
1477 1480 3 0.2%
1414 1412 -2 -0.1%
845 844 -1 -0.1%
1183 1182 -1 -0.1%

Table 1: Discrepancies in Numbers of Ballots Counted by
Hand vs. Counted by Scanner[1] in Eighteen Districts, November 2010 Audits

We have omitted reports from the table where zero ballots were reported for one or the other of the two counts.

Based on observer reports, we do not believe that all of the hand counts are accurate because of the questionable counting methods observed.  On the other hand, because of these differences, we also have no basis to conclude that the scanners counted all ballots accurately.
In general, when compared to the November 2009 report except for two extreme cases, there is little difference in the performance of the optical scanners and the election officials in counting ballots:

Nov 2009

Scanner Counted Ballots Hand Counted Ballots Difference Percent Difference
919 904 15 1.6%
1315 1298 17 1.3%
771 762 9 1.2%
1164 1169 -5 0.4%
492 494 -2 0.4%
1046 1050 -4 0.4%
1007 1004 3 0.3%
677 679 -2 0.3%
1362 1366 -4 0.3%
449 450 -1 0.2%
1900 1904 -4 0.2%
961 963 -2 0.2%
762 763 -1 0.1%
861 860 1 0.1%
2046 2044 2 0.1%
1877 1876 1 0.1%
3357 3358 -1 0.0%

Table 2: Discrepancies in Numbers of Ballots Counted by
Hand vs. Counted by Scanner[2] in Seventeen Districts, November 2009 Audits

B. Vote Count Accuracy

Even considering confusion over ballots with questionable votes, an analysis of the district reports submitted to the Secretary of the State indicates that vote count discrepancies remain.

Nov 2010

Col C Machine Totals (tape) Col D Undisputed Vote Totals Col E Questionable Vote Totals Col F Overall Hand Count Totals (D+E) Difference Percent Difference
776 569 37 606 170 21.9%
759 559 36 595 164 21.6%
695 513 30 543 152 21.9%
881 936 0 936 -55 6.2%
139 99 6 105 34 24.5%
113 81 3 84 29 25.7%
888 917 0 917 -29 3.3%
84 56 2 58 26 31.0%
692 717 0 717 -25 3.6%
452 476 0 476 -24 5.3%
745 767 0 767 -22 3.0%
689 668 0 668 21 3.0%
40 21 1 22 18 45.0%
674 692 0 692 -18 2.7%
914 899 0 899 15 1.6%
726 712 0 712 14 1.9%
1023 1007 2 1009 14 1.4%
1639 1625 0 1625 14 0.9%
1292 1279 0 1279 13 1.0%
796 809 0 809 -13 1.6%
562 550 0 550 12 2.1%
55 43 0 43 12 21.8%
871 883 0 883 -12 1.4%
1300 1311 0 1311 -11 0.8%
645 625 10 635 10 1.6%
23 12 1 13 10 43.5%
1422 1412 0 1412 10 0.7%
559 569 2 571 -10 1.8%

Table 3: Candidate counts where Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes Show Discrepancies of 10 Or More Votes 2010 Audit.

The table on the previous page presents, by number and percentage, vote differences greater than 10 between hand-counted votes and machine-counted votes when all ballots with questionable votes are included[3] and all votes for cross-endorsed candidates are totaled.

Based on observer reports, we do not believe that all of the hand counts are accurate because of the questionable counting methods observed.  On the other hand, because of these differences, we also have no basis to conclude that the scanners counted all votes accurately.

In general, when compared to November 2009, the November 2010 data shows a much worse performance in counting votes by the optical scanners, election officials, or both than in 2010:

Nov 2009

Col C Machine Totals (tape) Col D Undisputed Vote Totals Col E Questionable Vote Totals Col F Overall Hand Count Totals (D+E) Difference Percent Difference
2042 2103 0 2103 -61 3.0%
612 541 11 552 60 -9.8%
1045 1088 0 1088 -43 4.1%
556 518 11 529 27 -4.9%
932 910 0 910 22 -2.4%
1488 1466 0 1466 22 -1.5%
1453 1435 0 1435 18 -1.2%
1279 1263 0 1263 16 -1.3%
1140 1124 0 1124 16 -1.4%
992 976 0 976 16 -1.6%
1323 1309 0 1309 14 -1.1%
1198 1184 0 1184 14 -1.2%
1420 1407 0 1407 13 -0.9%
588 567 8 575 13 -2.2%
267 253 2 255 12 -4.5%
1067 1055 0 1055 12 -1.1%
2083 2072 0 2072 11 -0.5%
496 480 5 485 11 -2.2%
775 760 4 764 11 -1.4%
465 439 16 455 10 -2.2%
387 373 4 377 10 -2.6%
973 963 0 963 10 -1.0%
552 532 10 542 10 -1.8%

Table 4: Candidate counts where Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes Show Discrepancies of 10 Or More Votes 2009 Audit.

The following table shows the number of candidate counts with various levels of count differences between the optical scanners and the hand counts, considering ballots with questionable votes:[4]

Nov 2010

Count Difference Number of Candidate Counts % Of All Counts
0 317 57.3%
1-3 147 26.6%
4-6 36 6.5%
7-9 25 4.5%
>=10 28 5.1%
Total 100.00%
Average Difference: 3.2 votes

Table 5: Distribution by Difference of Candidate Counts between
Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes 2010 Audit.

Looking at the data this way and comparing with 2009, we see that 2009 differences were not only less, but based on a significantly larger number of total counts:

Nov 2009
Count Difference Number of Candidate Counts % Of All Counts
0 427 56.6%
1-3 233 30.9%
4-6 57 7.6%
7-9 14 1.9%
[5]>=10 23 3.1%
Total 754 100.00%
Average Difference: 1.6 votes

Table 6: Distribution by Difference of Candidate Counts between
Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes 2009 Audit.

Using the same data as the previous table, omitting small counts with small differences[6], this table also shows the number of candidate counts with various levels of percentages of differences between the optical scanners and the hand counts, considering ballots with questionable votes:

Nov 2010

Range of % of Count Difference % Of All Counts In Range Number of Candidate Counts
0 52.7% 242
> 0 and < 0.5 % 20.5% 94
0.5 % and < 1.0 % 9.6% 44
1.0 % and < 2.0 % 7.2% 33
2.0 % and < 5.0 % 6.3% 29
5.0 % and < 10.0 % 1.3% 6
10.0 % and greater 2.4% 11
Total 100.0% 459
Average Difference % 0.59%

Table 7: Distribution by Difference of Significant Candidate Counts (30 or more votes) between Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes
By Ranges Of Percent 2010 Audit.

We note that if we were to trust these counts as an accurate representation of the optical scanner’s counting:

  • For over 27% of candidate vote counts, the machine count difference is greater that 0.5% which is the maximum level for requiring a close vote recanvass. For statewide races the threshold is significantly lower since the maximum difference for an automatic recanvass is 2000 votes, which represents a much lower percentage than the usual 0.5%.

We do not believe that all of these counts are accurate.  But we have no reason to believe that all the hand count differences can be attributed to human counting error. For public confidence it would seem important that all unsatisfactorily or unexplained discrepancies between machine counts and official, final audit results should be significantly lower than the maximum threshold for automatic recanvasses.

We continue to support investigations and recounting in public of all unsatisfactorily explained differences over an agreed upon threshold per count.

Looking at the data this way and comparing with 2009, we observe the same trend as in the previous charts:

Nov 2009

Range of % of Count Difference % Of All Counts In Range Number of Candidate Counts
0 55.3% 380
> 0 and < 0.5 % 19.5% 134
0.5 % and < 1.0 % 9.3% 64
1.0 % and < 2.0 % 11.4% 78
2.0 % and < 5.0 % 3.2% 22
5.0 % and < 10.0 % 1.2 % 8
10.0 % and greater 0.0 % 0
Total 100.0% 686
Average Difference % 0.37%

Table 8: Distribution by Difference of Significant Candidate Counts (30 or more votes) between Hand-Counted Votes and Machine-Counted Votes
By Ranges Of Percent 2009 Audit.

C. “Questionable” Votes and “Undisputed” Ballots

Observations and comments from election officials indicate confusion about classifying “undisputed ballots” and about counting “questionable votes.”[7] An undisputed ballot is a ballot with no apparent problem or questionable votes on it. A questionable vote is a mark on a ballot that may not have been read properly by the optical scanner.  Audits exhibited a variety of interpretations of what constitutes “undisputed” and “ballots with questionable votes.”  Audit statistics confirm these observations.

The following table has some examples of candidate counts with the largest percentages of questionable votes. Note that, in general, the optical scanners seem to have counted accurately many of the votes classified by officials as questionable.

Nov 2010

Col C Machine Totals (tape) Col D Undisputed Vote Totals Col E Questionable Vote Totals Col F Overall Hand Count Totals

(D+E)

Percent Questionable
776 569 37 606 4.8%
318 303 14 317 4.4%
137 131 6 137 4.4%
696 664 29 693 4.2%
338 330 11 341 3.3%
927 899 30 929 3.2%
316 308 10 318 3.2%
900 872 26 898 2.9%
819 799 23 822 2.8%

Table 9.  Examples of Candidate Counts with the Largest
Percentage of Questionable Votes 2010 Audit

Compared with 2009 this area shows improvement in that significantly fewer votes are classified as questionable, since observations show that officials often classify too many votes as questionable and the results of counting show that most votes classified as questionable are indeed counted by the scanners.  We also note that, on average, audits reported 0.46% of votes as questionable votes in 2010 vs. 2% in 2009.

Nov 2009

Col C Machine Totals (tape) Col D Undisputed Vote Totals Col E Questionable Vote Totals Col F Overall Hand Count Totals

(D+E)

Percent Questionable
68 58 9 67 13.2%
335 291 42 333 12.5%
975 857 118 975 12.1%
235 218 17 235 7.2%
629 589 42 631 6.7%
196 182 13 195 6.6%
647 605 41 646 6.3%
170 160 10 170 5.9%
1621 1557 70 1627 4.3%

Table 10.  Examples of Candidate Counts with the Largest
Percentage of Questionable Votes 2009 Audit (one example per town)


[1] The law and audit procedures often use the term “Tabulator” to refer to election machines.  We use the terms “Scanner” or “Optical Scanner” to make the report clearer.

[2] The law and audit procedures often use the term “Tabulator” to refer to election machines.  We use the terms “Scanner” or “Optical Scanner” to make the report clearer.

[3] This is the most favorable interpretation of the audit reports, giving every benefit of the doubt to the accuracy of machine counts and the accuracy of hand counts.  When Total Hand Count Totals is less than or equal to the Machine Totals, then the Questionable Vote Totals are included.  When Undisputed Totals is greater than or equal to the Machine Totals then all Questionable Vote Totals are excluded.  In the remaining cases enough Questionable  Vote Totals are included to make the difference zero.

[4] This table and the following table provide data similar to that provided by the University of Connecticut in analyzing the November 2008 post-election audit, available at: http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/wp-content/uploads/2008-Nov-Hand-V10.pdf

[5] The original 2009 report has this as >10, it is correctly >=10

[6] The table omits candidate counts with tape counts less than 30 votes that have differences less than 3 votes.

[7] Part of the confusion comes from as the terms “Undisputed Ballots” and “Questionable Votes.”  One term refers to ballots, the other to votes, where the process must focus at different times between classifying ballots and classifying votes.  Also the terms can add to the confusion between votes which might have been read two different ways by the scanner and votes that should have been read one way by the scanner, yet that reading would not accurately reflect the voter’s intent.