Report

Districts in the Random Drawing Study

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts

Based on concerns with the integrity of the random drawing in previous elections, the Coalition initiated a project to thoroughly check the integrity of the list of districts in the drawing for the November 2013 election.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “The credibility of our elections depends on the integrity of the Post-Election Audits. The integrity of the audits in-turn depends on the integrity of the drawing.”

The report found,

  • Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
  • Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
  • The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
  • The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
  • Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>

Nov 2012 Post-Election Audit Report – Flawed From The Start

Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts

The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:

  • Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

Aug 2012 Primary Audit Observation Report

Coalition finds 31% of Official Audit Reports Lack Critical Data

Municipalities failed to report data critical to audit evaluation. Increasing numbers choose paper only elections, avoiding scanners and audits.

The report highlighted concerns with two increasing trends:

  • An increase in missing and incomplete official reports. There are 16 of 52 (31%) reports with errors making it impossible to determine if machines had functioned properly. What basis is there to trust audits, with this significant level of error in reporting?
  • Up up to 19 towns avoided optical scanners and audits by conducting paper only elections. Such voting is not audited, not transparent, and error prone based on past observations of hand counts.

We conclude, based on our observations and analysis of official audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State, that the August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence.
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Review detail data and municipal reports>

Apr 2012 Primary Audit Observation Report

Based on the size and relative simplicity of this audit, we provide an abbreviated report. We summarize the statistical information and observations, while we make no new recommendations.
Readers of past reports will note little change in our observations and conclusions; and little progress by officials in improving post-election audit integrity. Compared to past audits there were significantly fewer ballot count and race count differences in this audit. The fewer number of ballots and the single race to be counted contributed to this improved result. We are skeptical that this audit is an indication of future improvement.

Items of note include:

  • Three towns selected for audit unsealed and combined their ballots from all districts, necessitating a town-wide count for the audit. This highlighted that ballots are not required by law to be sealed under a secure chain-of-custody during the audit period, only for the fourteen (14) day “lock-down” period originally applicable to lever voting machines.
  • Despite the simplicity of the counting, several towns were unable to completely or correctly complete the official audit report form.
  • One town’s report showed significant differences between the manual and machine counts for votes. The audit report form from this town was among those that were incomplete.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Review detail data and municipal reports>

Nov 2011 Election Audit Observation Report – Data Available for Public Review

Coalition finds continuing problems with audit integrity
Provides calculations and official data on the web for public review and verification

For the first time, in the interest of public information and transparency, we are making all official municipal audit reports and the data we complied available for everyone to review on the web. Citizens can see the reports from their own town, other towns, and perform their own audit of the Coalition’s data entry and calculations based on those official reports. The November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued:

  • Lack of integrity in the random district selection and race selection processes.
  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

 <Full Report, Press Release, Excerpts>        <Review detail data and municipal reports>

Nov 2010 Election Audit Observation Report

Coalition calls again for legislature to act. Citizen observation and analysis show little, if any, improvement in November post-election audits.

The Coalition noted significant differences between results reported by optical scanners and the hand count of ballots by election officials across Connecticut. Compared to previous audits, the Coalition noted little, if any, improvement in the attention to detail and in following procedures in the November 2010 audits.

Bridgeport Recount Report and Recommendations

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Aug 2010 Post-Election Audit Observation Report – Incremental Improvement – New Integrity Concern

Citizen observation and analysis shows some improvements along with a newly uncovered problem with the random selection process…We conclude that August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence

the list of polling districts for the random audit drawing was missing some districts and is otherwise inaccurate and ambiguous. The integrity of the audit requires an accurate list of districts that is verifiable by the public. We have extended our recommendations to the Legislature to include an efficient fix to this problem.

Nov 2009 Observation Report – Improvement, Yet Still Unsatisfactory

The Coalition noted significant differences between results reported by optical scanners and the hand count of ballots by election officials across Connecticut. Compared to previous audits, the Coalition noted small incremental improvements in the attention to detail, following procedures, and in the chain-of-custody.

In this report, we conclude that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence. We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

Nov 2008 Observation Report – Large Differences From Optical Scanner Totals

We conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence…Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently

In some cases as many as twenty-four (24) fewer ballots were counted by hand than recorded by optical scanners.

For individual candidate races, vote counts between hand counts and scanner tapes varied by as much as three-hundred-sixty-six (366) votes in one race or as much as 46% in another.

We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.