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Based on the size and relative simplicity of this audit, we provide an abbreviated report. We summarize the statistical information and observations, while we make no new recommendations.
As we said in our Nov 2011 report, readers of past reports will note little change in our observations and conclusions; little progress by officials in improving post-election audit integrity; and little change in our recommendations which have been, for the most part, not addressed by current and past Legislatures and Secretary of the State’s Offices.
Compared to past audits there were significantly fewer ballot count and race count differences in this audit. The fewer number of ballots and the single race to be counted contributed to this improved result. We are skeptical that this audit is an indication of future improvement.
Items of note include:
- Three towns selected for audit unsealed and combined their ballots from all districts, necessitating a town-wide count for the audit. This highlighted that ballots are not required by law to be sealed under a secure chain-of-custody during the audit period, only for the fourteen (14) day “lock-down” period originally applicable to lever voting machines.
- Despite the simplicity of the counting, several towns were unable to completely or correctly complete the official audit report form.
- One town’s report showed significant differences between the manual and machine counts for votes. The audit report form from this town was among those that were incomplete.
The audit usually begins on the 15th day after each election and primary, however, the Secretary of the State’s office held the random drawing on May 15th, 21 days after the primary. After the election, there was a question raised by the Secretary of the State’s Office, that the law might not require an audit of a presidential primary. Such primaries are covered by different sections of the Connecticut statutes, than sections that cover other elections and primaries. It was determined to conduct a presidential primary post-election audit, keeping with the precedent set in 2008 by Secretary Susan Bysiewicz. Those same variations in statute provide the for the legal use of paper ballots without optical scanners. This delay necessitated three towns selected for audit to count all their ballots in every district as the ballots had been unsealed and combined for storage.
Anticipating a very small primary, a number of municipalities used paper ballots without scanners as a means of saving the expense of programming and testing optical scanners. Only polling place optically scanned ballots are audited.
